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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : Supreme Court No. 920114 
v. : Court of Appeals No. 900473-CA 
C. DEAN LARSEN, : Priority No. 14 
Defendant/Petitioner. : 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
By its August 14, 1992, order the Utah Supreme Court 
accepted certiorari review of this action. The Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3)(a) and 78-2-
2(5). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Is scienter—the intent to defraud, deceive or 
manipulate—an element of the crime of securities fraud under 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-1(2) and 61-1-21? A trial court's 
interpretation of statutory law is reviewed for correctness. 
State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 796 (Utah 1991). 
2. Is expert testimony, concluding that an alleged 
misrepresentation or omission is "material," inadmissible in a 
prosecution for securities fraud under Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-
1(2)? While decisions to admit evidence are reviewed for "abuse 
of discretion", "[wjhether a piece of evidence is admissible is a 
-1-
question of lawf and we always review questions of law under a 
correctness standard . • . . [I]t is possible that we might refer 
casually to this standard of review as an 'abuse of discretion' 
standard. In fact, it is not." State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 
781-82 n.3 (Utah 1991) . 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1: 
It is unlawful for any person, in 
connection with the offer, sale, or purchase 
of any security, directly or indirectly to: 
(1) employ any device, scheme, or 
artifice to defraud; 
(2) make any untrue statement of a 
material fact or to omit to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they are made, not 
misleading; or 
(3) engage in any act, practice, or 
course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person. 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21: 
(1) A person who willfully violates any 
provision of this chapter except Section 61-
1-16, or who willfully violates any rule or 
order under this chapter, or who willfully 
violates Section 61-1-16 knowing the 
statement made to be false or misleading in 
any material respect, shall upon conviction 
be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned 
not more than five years, or both. 
(2) No person may be imprisoned for the 
violation of any rule or order if he proves 
that he had no knowledge of the rule or 
order. 
-2-
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-27: 
This chapter may be so construed as to 
effectuate its general purpose to make 
uniform the law of those states which enact 
it and to coordinate the interpretation and 
administration of this chapter with the 
related federal regulation. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 ("Rule 10b-5"): 
It shall be unlawful for any person, 
directly or indirectly, by the use of any 
means or instrumentality of interstate 
commerce, or of the mails or of any facility 
of any national securities exchange, 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or 
artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a 
material fact or to omit to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not 
misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or 
course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, 
in connection with the purchase or sale of 
any security. 
Rule 704, Utah Rules of Evidence: 
Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference 
otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it 
embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier 
of fact. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This action involves a securities fraud prosecution 
which raises a question of first impression in Utah: Is 
scienter—the intent to defraud, manipulate or deceive—an 
element of the crime of securities fraud under Utah Code Ann. §§ 
61-1-1(2) and 61-1-21. Under federal law on which these 
provisions are patterned and with which Utah's Act was intended 
to harmonize, it is. The Utah Court of Appeals says it is not. 
This appeal raises a second issue relating to the permissible 
scope of expert opinion regarding the materiality of alleged 
omissions in securities offering materials. At trial, the 
government was permitted, over objection, to present the "expert" 
testimony of Sherwood Cook that certain facts allegedly not 
disclosed to investors were "material." 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition of the Court 
of Appeals 
The government charged Mr. Larsen with securities fraud 
under the above provisions, alleging that he misrepresented or 
omitted material facts in connection with the offer, sale or 
purchase of securities. (Ct. App. Opinion at 4).1 Mr. Larsen 
asked the trial court to instruct the jury that an intent to 
xThe official decision of the Utah Court of Appeals issued 
on February 7, 1992. A copy is attached as Appendix A. It was 
published at 828 P.2d 487 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
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defraud is an element of the charges and that his good faith is a 
defense. (Defendant's Requested Jury Instructions Nos. 4-5, 30, 
R. 1353-56, 1381, attached as Appendix B). This was refused. 
(Appendix B). The jury was told instead that it is enough to 
convict a person for securities fraud in Utah simply if he or she 
acts "willfully": "When it is his conscious objective or desire 
to engage in the conduct or cause a result." (Instructions to 
the Jury, Nos. 14, 17 and 17A, R. 1309, 1312-13, Appendix C). 2 
On June 20, 1990, the jury convicted Mr. Larsen. On 
February 7, 1992, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the trial 
court, rejecting the view that intent to defraud is an element of 
a criminal violation of §§ 61-1-1(2) and 61-1-27. (Ct. App. 
Opinion at 13-14, Appendix A). The Court of Appeals also found 
that the trial court did not err in admitting Mr. Cook's 
testimony. (Ct. App. Opinion at 10-11, Appendix A). 
C. Statement of Facts 
Facts necessary to review the issues appear in text. 
2The trial court granted a Certificate of Probable Cause on 
March 4, 1991. The court expressed concern that specific intent 
is an added element of securities fraud with which Mr. Larsen was 
charged. (Transcript of Proceedings, February 19, 1991, pp. 47-
48, Appendix D). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. Intent to Defraud is an Element of a 
Violation of S§ 61-1-1 and 61-1-21 
The Court of Appeals decision that intent to defraud is 
not an element of securities fraud under §§ 61-1-1(2) and 61-1-
21, collides with the interpretation of the related federal 
provision, federal Rule X-10b-5 ("Rule 10b-5"), 17 C.F.R. § 
240.10b-5, on which Utah's Act was patterned and with which 
Utah's law was intended to harmonize. See Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-
27. A violation of Rule 10b-5 requires such intent. 
Consistently, good faith is a defense under Rule 10b-5. Utah's 
legislature intended § 61-1-1 to have the same interpretation. 
Contrary to this intent, the Court of Appeals holding now permits 
strict-liability conviction with possible imprisonment, as in 
this case, without proof of this intent and regardless of the 
actor's good faith belief. (Ct. App. Opinion at 13-14). 
2. Expert Testimony on Materiality Under the 
Securities Law is Improper 
The trial court incorrectly admitted testimony of the 
State's expert witness, Sherwood Cook, that certain facts Mr. 
Larsen allegedly omitted from securities registration disclosure 
documents were "material." The Court of Appeals held that the 
testimony was permissible because it went to "an ultimate issue 
of fact." In so ruling, the Court relied on vacated case 
authority and misconstrued Rule 704 Utah R. Evid. which abolished 
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the "ultimate fact" rule. The Court of Appeals' decision 
conflicts with securities cases holding that expert testimony 
like Mr. Cook's is inadmissible. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Intent to Defraud is an Element of a Criminal 
Violation of Sections 61-1-1(2^ and 61-1-21 
Section 61-1-1(2), construed as intended by Utah's 
legislature, in harmony with United States Supreme Court 
decisions interpreting the related federal provision (Rule 10b-5) 
on which § 61-1-1 was patterned, reveals that "scienter," (the 
intent to defraud, manipulate or deceive)3 is an element of the 
offense that the jury should have considered. 
1. Section 61-1-1 Was Patterned After Rule 10b-5 
In 1963, the Utah Legislature adopted (with certain 
revisions unimportant here) the Uniform Securities Act ("Uniform 
Act"). This is known as the Utah Uniform Securities Act ("Utah 
Act"). See Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-28. Section 101 of the Uniform 
Act (§ 61-1-1 of Utah's Act) was patterned after Federal 
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") Rule X-10B-5 (Rule 
10b-5). See Uniform Securities Act § 101, Official Comment, 
reprinted in Louis B. Loss, Commentary on the Uniform Securities 
3The United States Supreme Court defined "scienter," an 
element of a securities fraud violation under Section 10(b) and 
Federal Rule lOb-5, as "a mental state embracing the intent to 
deceive, manipulate, or defraud." Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 
425 U.S. 184, 193 n.12 (1976). 
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Act 6 (1976). The language of the three classes of proscribed 
activity under § 61-1-1 and Rule 10b-5 is identical. Compare 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 and 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5; pp. 2-3 supra. 
Consistently, under both § 61-1-1 and Rule 10b-5, criminal 
penalties are set for any "willful" violation/ Utah Code Ann. 
§ 61-1-21; 15 U.S.C. § 78ff. 
The State has incorrectly implied that Rule 10b-5 was 
not the model for § 61-1-1 because the SEC, in drafting the rule, 
drew language from § 17a of the Securities Act of 1933 ("the 1933 
Act"). While language for Rule 10b-5 was borrowed from § 17a, 
the intent of Rule 10b-5 was derived from § 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), (not § 17a 
of the 1933 Act), which empowered the SEC to act and which 
provided the standard of liability that must be imposed. 425 
U.S. at 200.5 Rule 10b-5 "was adopted pursuant to authority 
granted the Commission under § 10(b) . . .to carry into effect 
AMr. Larsen does not challenge the trial court's instruction 
on "willfulness." (Instruction No. 17, Appendix C). Willfulness 
is also an element of a § 61-1-1 violation. The trial court and 
Court of Appeals erred by refusing to instruct that scienter was 
a separate, additional element of the offence. See infra pp. 10-
18. 
5Congress fashioned standards of fault on a particularized 
basis under the securities laws. See Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 
200. "Ascertainment of congressional intent with respect to the 
standard of liability created by a particular section of the Acts 
must therefore rest on the language of that section." .Id. Here, 
the sole focus of inquiry is § 10(b) under which Rule 10b-5 was 
promulgated. Congressional intent for other sections, such as 
§ 17a of the 1933 Act, is thus irrelevant. 
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the will of Congress as expressed by the statute." (425 U.S. at 
212-13). The Draftsmen's Commentary to § 101 of the Uniform Act 
confirms that Rule 10b-5 was "the logical model" for a uniform 
state fraud provision because of the language disparities in 
existing state statutes and "because of the substantial body of 
-judicial precedent which has been developed under the federal 
provisions." Louis B. Loss, Commentary on the Uniform Securities 
Act 7 (1976) (emphasis supplied). 
This comment also reveals that the draftsmen 
anticipated that adopting states would construe § 101 in harmony 
with federal court interpretation of Rule 10b-5. A prominent 
commentator on Utah law (Professor Wallace Bennett) presumed that 
federal and state court construction of like provisions would be 
identical. See Wallace F. Bennett, Securities Regulation in 
Utah; A Recap of History and the New Uniform Act, 1963 Utah L. 
Rev. 216, 232 n.112 ("Similarity to the federal statute will 
allow for interchangeability of judicial precedence in this 
important area"). 
Utah's legislature expressed synonymous intent. Aware 
of the Utah Act's federal origin, Utah's legislature declared 
that the Act was intended not only to encourage uniformity among 
the states, but "to coordinate the interpretation and 
administration of this chapter with the related federal 
regulation." Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-27 (emphasis supplied). The 
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Utah Act must be construed to effectuate this "general purpose." 
Id. 
2. Scienter is Required to Violate Rule 10b-5 
and § 61-1-1 
The SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5, the federal regulation 
"related" to § 61-1-1, under authority of § 10(b) of the 1934 Act 
which proscribes "any manipulative or deceptive device or 
contrivance" in contravention of SEC rules. See Hochfelder, 425 
U.S. at 195. Section 10(b) was intended to address "practices 
that involve some element of scienter . . . ." 425 U.S. at 201. 
See also Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 713 (1980) (Blackmun 
concurring and dissenting). Rule 10b-5 requires the same mental 
state. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 212-14. See also Dirks v. SEC, 
463 U.S. 646, 663 n.23 (1983) ("[s]cienter--'a mental state 
embracing intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud,' [citation 
omitted]—is an independent element of a Rule 10b-5 violation"), 
citing Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193-94 n.12. See also Aaron, 446 
U.S. at 695. Plainly, proof of scienter is also required for a 
criminal violation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 which from 
their genesis have been used for criminal prosecution (see 15 
U.S.C. § 78ff) and later for a judicially-implied private cause 
of action. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 
723, 730 (1975); Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 196. This is "the 
interpretation" of § 61-1-1's "related federal regulation" 
contemplated by the Utah legislature. See Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-
-10-
27; Payable Accounting Corp. v. McKinley, 667 P.2d 15, 17 (Utah 
1983) (in construing Utah securities law, the Court relied on 
federal case law interpreting the similar federal statute). 
Thus, while the language of Rule 10b-5 (b) & (c), like 
Utah's § 61-1-1(2) & (3), viewed in isolation, could be read to 
apply to any type of material misstatement or omission, 
intentional or not (the apparent basis of the Utah Court of 
Appeals' holding), usuch a reading cannot be harmonized with the 
administrative history of the rule." Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 
212. "In the absence of a conflict between reasonably plain 
meaning and legislative history, the words of the statute must 
prevail." Aaron, 446 U.S. at 700. The Utah legislature intended 
that § 61-1-1 and Rule 10b-5 would be similarly construed. 
3. Good Faith is a Defense 
Hand-in-hand with the scienter element is the 
consistent notion that good faith is a defense under Utah's § 61-
1-1 and Rule 10b-5. Construing Rule 10b-5 and § 10(b) of the 
1934 Act, the Hochfelder Court explained that "[t]here is no 
indication that Congress intended anyone to be made liable for 
[manipulative, deceptive or illicit] practices unless he acted 
other than in good faith." 425 U.S. at 206. The scienter 
requirement functions in part to protect good faith error. 
Dirks, 463 U.S. at 674-75 n.ll (Blackmun, J. dissenting). See 
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also State v. Puckett, 6 Kan. App. 2d 688, 634 P.2d 144, 152 
(1981), aff'd 230 Kan. 296, 640 P.2d 1198 (1982). 
The reasoned decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court are persuasive here as Utah's legislature intended: 
Where a state statute is patterned after a federal 
statute, the decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court and inferior federal courts, interpreting the 
parent federal statute, are, even though they were 
handed down after the adoption by the state of the 
federal statute, most persuasive, particularly where 
such interpretations are the only ones extant with 
respect to the disputed words of the state statute. 
75 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes § 335 (1974) (emphasis supplied). See 
also McKinlev, 667 P.2d at 17; Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P.2d 111, 
115 (Utah 1991) ("[t]he primary rule of statutory interpretation 
is to give effect to the intent of the legislature in light of 
the purpose the statute was meant to achieve"); State v. Taylor, 
82 Ariz. 289, 312 P.2d 162, 165-66 (1957) (subsequent 
interpretation of federal statute was entitled to "great weight" 
in construing state statute); Geraghty v. National Bank of 
Commerce of Seattle, 8 Wash. 2d 437, 112 P.2d 846, 849 (1941); 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-27. 
Other states have correctly applied these principles in 
construing their version of § 61-1-1. See, e.g., Puckett, 634 
P.2d at 154, (citing Hochfelder and acknowledging scienter 
requirement); People v. Terranova, 38 Colo. App. 476, 563 P.2d 
363, 365-66 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977) (acknowledging scienter is an 
element, the court concluded: "we look to Federal court 
-12-
interpretation of Rule 10b-5 and the nature of the intent 
required to sustain a violation of the rule"). 
Several states, however, have failed to acknowledge (or 
were perhaps unaware of) the federal origin and meaning of the 
Uniform Securities Act and its intent to harmonize state and 
federal regulation. See, e.g., People v. Cook, 89 Mich. App. 72, 
279 N.W.2d 579 (1979) (Hochfelder and its progeny not mentioned); 
People v. Johnson, 213 Cal.App.3d 1369, 262 Cal.Rptr. 366 (1989); 
People v. Whitlow, 89 111.2d 322, 433, N.E.2d 629, 633-34, cert. 
denied, 459 U.S. 830 (1982); State v. Tembv, 108 Wis.2d 521, 322 
N.W.2d 522, 525-27 (1982); State v. Fries, 214 Neb. 874, 337 
N.W.2d 398, 404-05 (1983); State v. Ross, 104 N.M. 23, 715 P.2d 
471, 474 (N.M. App. 1986); State v. Tarzian, 136 Ariz. 238, 665 
P.2d 582, 585-86 (Ariz. App. 1983). The government urges these 
decisions which would permit sweeping, strict-liability 
prosecutions. The analysis applied in these opinions, however, 
conflicts with Utah's legislative mandate. 
First, of these seven jurisdictions, four appear not to 
have the specific legislative directive found in Utah to construe 
these laws in accordance with the related federal regulation. 
See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44-1800 et sea., Cal. Corp. Code 
§ 25000 et sea. , 111. Rev. Stat. § 121*s-137.1 et sea., (language 
broader than the Uniform Act), N.M. Stat. Ann. § 58-13B-1 et sea. 
Only Michigan, Wisconsin and Nebraska have statutory provisions 
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similar to § 61-1-27. Decisions from two of these three 
jurisdictions make no mention of federal law, apparently unaware 
of federal precedent and the legislative intent. See State v. 
Fries, 214 Neb. 874, 337 N.W.2d 398 (1983); People v. Cook, 89 
Mich. App. 72 279 N.W.2d 579 (1979). Court analysis in the third 
jurisdiction, Wisconsin, is equally flawed because it fails to 
discern the controlling federal rule. In State v. Temby, 108 
Wis. 2d 521, 322 N.W.2d 522, 525-27 (1982) the court inexplicably 
cites Aaron for the proposition that intent to defraud is not an 
element under "the federal statute dealing with fraudulent 
securities transactions." 322 N.W.2d at 526 (emphasis supplied). 
Apparently unaware of the many other federal provisions dealing 
with fraudulent securities transactions, the Tembv court 
overlooked the Aaron holding that Rule 10b-5, the model for the 
provision at issue in Tembv, and here, requires scienter. Aaron, 
446 U.S. at 691. 
These cases are deficient in other ways. For example, 
State v. Ross, 104 N.M. 23, 715 P.2d 471, 474 (Ct. App. 1986), 
relied in part on pre-Hochfelder federal cases which, to the 
extent they did not require scienter, were overruled by 
Hochfelder. 425 U.S. at 212-13. In short, these opinions cannot 
be reconciled with Utah's legislative intent. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 61-1-27; McKinlev, 667 P.2d at 17. 
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Yet, like those courts, the Court of Appeals deviates 
from the federal pattern, focusing solely on the language of 
§ 61-1-21 and on Mr. Larsen's use of the now-outmoded phrase 
"specific intent" in his description of the scienter element.6 
(Ct. App. Opinion at 13-14). It never considered Utah's 
legislative mandate, the related federal rule to which Utah 
courts were intended to look, and never mentioned Hochfelder and 
its progeny. (Ct. App. Opinion at 13-14). As a result, the 
holding drives a wedge between Utah law and its federal model, 
contributing to regulatory discord, contrary to the intent of § 
61-1-1. See Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-27. 
The Court of Appeals' decision not only offends 
legislative intent, it spawns grave uncertainty among Utah 
businesses and investors who now face criminal conviction for a 
good faith mistake. Such concerns are evidenced by Hochfelder 
where a national accounting firm was sued for securities fraud 
violations under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The plaintiff 
claimed that accountants acted with "inexcusable negligence" by 
conducting an audit that failed to reveal that the audited 
company, a brokerage firm, had defrauded investors. Hochfelder, 
425 U.S. at 190 n.5. The Hochfelder Court held that the 
6Mr. Larsen's requested jury instructions specified that 
"the specific intent to defraud" had to be shown. (Defendants' 
Requested Instruction No. 5). Mr. Larsen expressly cited 
Hochfelder as authority for the intent element. (Defendants' 
Requested Instruction No. 4). (Ct. App. Opinion at 13-14). 
-15-
accountants' good faith was a defense and that negligence was 
insufficient to impose liability. Id. at 213-14. If, however, 
the Hochfelder accountants were sued in Utah for securities 
fraud, as the Court of Appeals now defines it, the result would 
be quiet different; they would have no "intent" defense even if 
they acted reasonably and in good faith. (Ct. App. Opinion at 
13-14). 
This example reveals important policy considerations 
that support the scienter requirement in Hochfelder. Investors 
require concise, understandable reports to make informed 
investment decisions. If an accounting firm, for example, were 
held criminally or civilly liable for its failure to discover and 
disclose a material fact without proof of scienter, accounting 
firms would be disinclined to provide reports unqualified in any 
respect because of the daunting risk associated with their 
representations or good faith oversight. Additionally, investors 
may no longer receive relevant information in digestible form as 
overly cautious professionals and business people deluge 
investors with insignificant records and "information" to avoid 
criminal liability for failure to disclose something that could 
possibly be material. Some responsible individuals and entities 
might find the risk unacceptable and stop providing investor 
services altogether. 
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These effects are avoided by the scienter requirement 
that better protects investors. The scienter rule sends clear 
warning to those who would deceive or manipulate the investing 
public7, while allowing securities-related businesses to provide 
useful, appropriate information to investors with a degree of 
assurance that they author their own future. In contrast, the 
Court of Appeals' holding exposes persons and entities involved 
with securities—brokers, accountants, financial advisors and 
others—to criminal prosecution for good-faith actions taken to 
assist the investing public. This result conflicts with the 
purpose of the federal rule with which § 61-1-1 was intended to 
harmonize. 
In short, Section 61-1-1 must not be read in isolation, 
as the Court of Appeals implies; it must be construed like Rule 
10b-5 in harmony with its legislative and administrative genesis, 
Ma history making clear that when the Commission adopted the 
Rule, it was intended to apply only to activities that involved 
scienter." Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 212. The trial court's 
refusal to instruct the jury concerning this element of the 
offenses charged under § 61-1-1, as Mr. Larsen requested, is 
reversible error. State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059, 1061 (1992). 
This failure, which constitutes a violation of due process (see 
7The strict liability effect of the Court of Appeals holding 
serves as no deterrent to a good faith mistake which, by its 
nature, is perceived by the actor as lawful and harmless. 
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Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 265 (1989); State v. Scott, 
110 Wash. 2d 682, 757 P.2d 492, 496 (1988) (en banc)), Mcan never 
be harmless error". Jones, 823 P.2d at 1061. 
B. "Materiality" Under Securities Law is Not a Proper 
Subject for Expert Opinion Testimony 
1. Introduction 
The trial court permitted the State's expert witness, 
Sherwood Cook, to testify, over objection,8 whether certain 
alleged omissions by Mr. Larsen would be "material." Mr. Cook 
was displayed to the jury as an attorney admitted in both Utah 
and Nevada, a former Utah securities regulation official and the 
top securities administrator for Nevada—someone "familiar with 
both the state and federal requirements of disclosure in limited 
offerings." (Transcript vol. VI at 39, 42, Appendix E). The 
State posed hypothetical questions to Mr. Cook consisting of a 
simplified rendition of the State's version of the case. 
(Transcript Vol. VI at 45, 76-77, 85-86, 89-91, Appendix E). The 
trial court allowed Mr. Cook to opine, in essence, that "facts" 
Mr. Larsen allegedly omitted from securities registration 
disclosure documents were "material." Mr. Cook, in effect, 
rendered his expert opinion that Mr. Larsen was guilty. 
8Prior to trial, counsel for Mr. Larsen also submitted a 
motion in limine to preclude opinion testimony from State 
"securities experts" regarding whether alleged representations or 
omissions met the legal standard of "materiality" for of a 
securities prosecution under Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1(2). The 
trial court did not rule. 
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(Transcript at 45, 76-77, 85-86, 89-91, Appendix E).9 Relying 
on invalid case authority, the Court of Appeals found the 
testimony proper because it went to "an ultimate issue of fact." 
(Ct. App. Opinion at 9-11).10 This ruling is incorrect. 
2. The Court of Appeals Disregarded the Correct 
Analysis of Federal Securities Actions 
Involving Expert Opinion and Relied on 
Vacated Case Authority 
Admission of Mr. Cook's testimony was error under the 
analysis applied in federal securities cases, cases which pose 
unique problems in defining the scope of proper expert testimony. 
In the first of the leading decisions, Scop v. United States, 846 
F.2d 135 (2d Cir.) modified on rehearing, 856 F.2d 5 (1988), the 
defendant was convicted of federal securities fraud after the 
government introduced opinion evidence through an SEC official 
offered as an expert witness. Taken as a whole, the expert 
opinions expressed that the defendant's actions constituted 
"manipulation" and "fraud" which were terms of the statute used 
to charge the defendant. Scopf 846 F.2d at 138. The Scop court 
9Cook even testified, over objection, regarding his 
supervision of another investigation of Mr. Larsen and others 
involving a transaction which took place prior to the events 
giving rise to this case. (Transcript Vol. VI at 47-52, Appendix 
E). 
10One member of the panel of the Court of Appeals declined 
to join in this section of the opinion. (Ct. App. Opinion at 
15). 
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found that the expert's use of statutory terms created an 
improper legal conclusion: 
Had Whitten [the witness] merely testified that 
controlled buying and selling of the kind alleged here 
can create artificial price levels to lure outside 
investors, no sustainable objection could have been 
made. Instead Whitten made no attempt to couch the 
opinion testimony in even conclusory factual statements 
but drew directly on the language of the statute and 
accompanying regulations concerning "manipulation" and 
"fraud." In essence, his opinions were legal 
conclusions that were highly prejudicial and went well 
beyond his province as an expert in securities trading. 
Id. at 140. Fear that the jury may have been mislead by such 
testimony was heightened by the fact that statutory terms like 
"manipulation" and "scheme to defraud" are not self-defining, but 
have been the subject of diverse judicial interpretation, ^d. at 
140-41. 
The analysis in Scop is understandable and persuasive. 
Like the expert opinion in Scop, Mr. Cook's testimony improperly 
drew on language of the statute under which Mr. larsen was 
charged — § 61-1-1. (Transcript Vol. VI at 86, 89, 91; Utah 
Code Ann. § 61-1-1). Mr. Cook's opinions "were calculated to 
invade the province of the court to determine the applicable law 
and to instruct the jury as to that law." JEd. at 140 citing 
F.A.A. v. Landv, 705 F.2d 624, 622 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 464 
U.S. 895 (1983); (Transcript Vol. VI at 89-91). The Court of 
Appeals failed to address this, remarking inexplicably that Mr. 
Cook used the legal, statutory term "material" in a "factual" 
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way. (Ct. App. Opinion p. 10). Moreover, like the statutory 
term "manipulation," disapproved for expert use in Scop, 
"materiality," an element of the offense charged here, is not a 
self-defining term. Id. 
Other securities cases confirm the problems associated 
with use of "securities expert" testimony regarding legal 
standards. In Marx & Co,, Inc. v. Diner's Club, Inc., 550 F.2d 
505 (2d Cir. 1977), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 861 (1977), a 
"securities expert" testified concerning what he thought the 
contract phrase "best efforts" meant, and whether or not the 
defendants there had used "best efforts." Id. at 509. The 
expert also testified that failure to issue a registration 
statement within 70 days was proof that "best efforts" were not 
used. Id., at 510. Finding this testimony an inadmissible legal 
opinion concerning "reasonableness" of delay in registration, the 
Marx court noted that securities fraud litigation presents a 
special danger of abuse of expert witness testimony: "With the 
growth of intricate securities litigation . . . we must be 
especially careful not to allow trials before juries to become 
battles of paid advocates posing as experts on the respective 
sides concerning matters of domestic law." Id. at 511. 
Adalman v. Baker, Watts & Co., 807 F.2d 359 (4th Cir. 
1986) is another example. There, the defendants attempted to 
call as an expert witness an attorney who was former counsel for 
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the defendants. The attorney was to testify concerning whether 
certain omitted information was "material" to an investment 
decision. The court held such testimony inadmissable because the 
expert would in effect "testify in substantial part to the 
meaning and applicability of the securities laws to the 
transactions [at issue], giving his expert opinion on the 
governing law." .Id. at 368. 
These cases reveal that while Mr. Cook's opinions were 
not improper just because they went to an "ultimate issue," they 
were improper because they are not "otherwise admissible" (Rule 
704, Utah R. Evid.); they "were legal conclusions that were 
highly prejudicial and went well beyond his province as an expert 
in securities trading." Scop, 846 F.2d at 140.n Like the 
testimony in Marx and Adalman, the objectionable portions of 
Cook's testimony "did not concern practices in the securities 
business on which [he] was qualified as an expert, but were 
11
 Both Marx and Adalman implicitly recognize the risk that 
experts in areas of law have their own ideas not only as to what 
the law requires, but what they think it should require. Often, 
as here, this line is blurred in the mind of the witness, let 
alone the juror's minds. These cases also recognize that 
testimony of legal experts in securities fraud cases presents 
significant conceptual problems which reach beyond securities 
issues. See, e.g., Adalman v. Baker, Watts & Co., 807 F.2d 359, 
366 (4th Cir. 1986) ("If such experts are to testify to the 
meaning and applicability of securities laws, what line is to be 
drawn to exclude tort lawyers from offering their expert opinions 
to the jury as to the meaning and applicability of laws governing 
tort litigation. Examples of this sort could be multiplied 
across the gamut of litigation"). 
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rather legal opinions as to the meaning of the . . . terms at 
issue." Marx at 509. 
The Court of Appeals disregarded this authority and 
relied instead on language from United States v. Leuben, 812 F.2d 
179 (5th Cir. 1987), which, apparently unknown to the Court of 
Appeals, was previously vacated. See United States v. Leuben, 
816 F.2d 1032, 1033 (5th Cir. 1987).12 Leuben, which involved 
neither securities claims nor actual testimony, consists of two 
reported decisions; the first, (the only one the Court of Appeals 
cites) noted that the parties had simply assumed that the issue 
of materiality under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 was a question of law, 
while under 18 U.S.C. § 1014 it was an issue of fact. 812 F.2d 
at 183. Relying on that assumption, the Leuben court held that 
expert testimony on a "factual" issue of materiality was 
permissible. Id,. It also held that under FRE 403, the trial 
court abused its discretion by permitting the government to put 
on expert testimony on "materiality" while prohibiting similar 
testimony by the defense. Jjd. at 184. 
The second Leuben decision (overlooked by the Court of 
Appeals), vacated its prior assumption that "materiality" was a 
fact question and held that the issue correctly was one of law. 
12Stating that it was "persuaded by Leuben", the Court of 
Appeals characterized the case as follows: "In Leuben, the Fifth 
Circuit held that expert opinion on materiality was admissible as 
being fact-oriented." (Ct. App. Opinion at 10). 
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Leuben, 816 F.2d 1032, 1033 (5th Cir. 1987). Given this 
subsequent correction, Leuben plainly does not stand for the 
proposition attributed to it by the Court of Appeals. (Ct. App. 
Opinion at 10). 
More importantly, even if the analysis of the first 
Leuben decision were valid, it would exclude Mr. Cook's 
testimony. The Leuben court characterized the proffered 
testimony as "fact-oriented" because it would have been phrased 
in terms of whether certain false statements would "'have the 
capacity to influence' a loan officer, not the legal question of 
whether the statements were 'material.'" Leuben, 812 F.2d at 
184. Here, while the State's questions may have been 
permissible, though very close to the line, Mr. Cook's responses 
entered forbidden ground when he characterized information as 
"material." (Transcript Vol. VI at 76-77, 86-87, 89, 91). Thus, 
even under Leuben, Cook's response, and the entire line of 
questioning viewed as a whole, fell within the range of evidence 
distinguished in Leuben as impermissible. Id. 
3. The Court of Appeals Misapplied Rule 704 
Rule 704 Utah R. Evid., modeled on the federal rule, 
abolished the prohibition on opinion testimony going to an 
"ultimate issue of fact." Relying on Leuben, the Court of 
Appeals apparently read Rule 704 to mean that opinion testimony 
is admissible if it goes to an issue of ultimate fact because, by 
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definition, it is not a legal conclusion. (Larsen, 828 P.2d at 
493). This incorrect approach stands Rule 704 on its head. 
Under Rule 704, evidence does not become admissible 
because it goes to an ultimate fact; rather it cannot be excluded 
only because it goes to an issue of ultimate fact.13 Testimony 
going to an ultimate fact issue may be inadmissible for other 
reasons; e.g., where, as here, that testimony embodies a legal 
conclusion. Scop, 846 F.2d at 139-40. 
The intent of Rule 704 is to eliminate the labelling 
problem created by the ultimate fact rule. (See Rule 704, Utah 
R. Evid. Advisory Committee Notes and Rule 704 Fed. R. Evid. 
Advisory Committee Notes). Yet the Court of Appeals' approach 
replaces one label with another. To say an issue is one of 
ultimate fact and not a legal opinion simply states the result 
and fails to clarify the basis for this determination. 
"Materiality" in the context of a securities claim cannot be 
neatly labelled as a legal or a fact issue; it is a conclusion 
reached by applying an objective legal standard to a set of 
facts. Here, the analysis must focus on whether the expert 
improperly supplants the judge as law giver and as the jury 
13
"The abolition of the ultimate issue rule does not lower 
the bars so as to admit all opinions. . . . [Rule 403, 701 and 
702] afford ample assurances against opinions which would merely 
tell the jury what result to reach." Marx, 550 F.2d at 511 n.17, 
citing Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rule 704, Fed. R. 
Evid. 
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instructor and on whether the opinions are "phrased in terms of 
inadequately explored legal criteria." Scop, 846 F.2d at 140. 
Mr. Cook's testimony is not troublesome because he gave 
evidence of a factual predicate for materiality. The error 
occurred when he was permitted in effect to instruct the jury 
that in his opinion Mr. Larsen failed to disclose material facts; 
in essence, that Mr. Larsen was guilty. (Transcript Vol. VI pp. 
86, 89, 91).1A This is not proper, as the court explained in 
14This was worsened by portions of Cook's testimony that 
were incomplete and misleading. At one point, Mr. Cook opined as 
follows: 
Q: And if there is a change that the seller realizes 
later on after he has used the document disclosing 
the investment manager will function, what is the 
proper way of dealing with that? 
Mr. Keller: Objection, 702. 
Court: Overruled. 
A: Investor should be informed of that change and 
given a chance to get out of the investment. 
(Transcript Vol. VI at 91-92). This question in effect asks Mr. 
Cook if, in his opinion, an offeror has a legal duty to correct 
or update offering materials. It is unclear whether the question 
is limited to the offering period or whether the obligation is 
absolute and continuing. While no Utah authority appears on this 
issue, under federal securities law the duty to update or correct 
is highly fact and time sensitive. See, e.g., Ross v. A.H. 
Robbins Co., Inc., 465 F. Supp. 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd on 
other grounds 607 F. 2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979), cert, denied 446 U.S. 
946 (1980). Mr. Cook stated a broad legal standard without 
qualification. This kind of testimony not only constitutes a 
legal conclusion, but because its correctness depends on facts 
not presented by the evidence or even hypothetically, it should 
have been excluded as an opinion "phrased in terms of 
inadequately explored legal criteria." Scop, 846 F.2d at 140. 
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Matthews v. Ashland Chemical, Inc., 770 F.2d 1303 (5th Cir. 
1985). There, the trial court excluded proffered expert 
testimony based on broad hypothetical questions that assumed 
every relevant fact and that required the expert to give legal 
opinions on the complex personal injury case, including proximate 
cause. Id. at 1311. The court affirmed, noting that the 
defendant was "asking his expert to tell the jury what result to 
reach after having been told all of the facts possibly relevant 
to the case." Id. at 1311. This case is no different. By 
admitting Cook's testimony, the trial court allowed the State's 
expert to instruct the jury on its result after rehearsing the 
facts of the State's case. (Transcript Vol. VI at 76-77, 86-87, 
89-91). 
This error is compounded by Mr. Cook's status as an 
attorney and securities regulator. The forceful impact of his 
ostensibly vast, specialized knowledge as an attorney in the 
securities area prevented subsequent correction of his improper 
testimony. This was explained in Specht v. Jensen, 853 F.2d 805 
(10th Cir. 1988). In Specht, a 1983 Civil Rights action for 
unlawful search, an attorney expert-witness for the plaintiff 
considered "hypothetical" circumstances which, according to the 
court, merely restated the plaintiffs' view of the evidence. Id. 
at 807. The attorney witness testified that as a constitutional 
expert, he believed no consent had been given and that the search 
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violated constitutional rights. Ld. at 809. The Court of 
Appeals reversed, finding that the witness supplanted both the 
trial court and jury with the "array of legal conclusions." Id. 
The error was not harmless: 
[g]iven the pervasive nature of this 
testimony, we cannot conclude its admission 
was harmless. There is a significant 
difference between an attorney who states his 
belief of what law should govern the case and 
any other expert witness. 
Id. at 808. 
Like the attorney witness in Specht, Mr. Cook, an 
attorney and securities regulator, "imbued with all the mystique 
inherent in the title 'expert,'" heightened the "substantial 
danger" that "the jury simply adopted the expert's conclusions 
rather than making its own decision." Jd. at 809. The error of 
admitting his testimony could not be corrected by cross-
examination, rebuttal, or instruction as the Court of Appeals 
suggests. Jd. See also United States v. Zipkin, 729 F.2d 384 
(6th Cir. 1984) (testimony by bankruptcy judge concerning his 
prior order and availability of interim fees not curable by 
cross-examination); Marx & Co., Inc. v. Diners' Club, Inc., 550 
F.2d 505, 511 (2d Cir. 1977) (" [Compelling the opponent to 
cross-examine to repair the damage is to invite disaster"); (Ct. 
App. Opinion at 11). Admitting the testimony of the State's 
attorney expert, Sherwood Cook, was improper and highly 
prejudicial. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, the Court should reverse the 
decisions of the Court of Appeals and trial court and remand for 
new trial. 
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R. Paul Van Dan and David B. Thompson, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee 
3efore Judges Bencn, Jackson, and Orme. 
BENCH, Presiding Judge; 
C. Dean Larsen appeals his conviction of eighteen counts of 
securities fraud and tneft en the ground that the Office of the 
Utah Attorney General rhe Attorney General) should have been 
disqualified from tne case for a conflict of interest. Larsen 
further asserts that formal investigation into wrongdoing was 
prompted by disclosure cf confidential information from nis 
attorney, and constituted an etnical violation. Larsen also 
challenges tne admissibility cf opinion testimony by the State's 
expert, the court's failure to prcnicit certain evidence, and its 
refusal to give certain 3ury instructions. We affirm. 
' .n ^  * O 
In the early 1970s, C. Dean Larsen, an attorney with a 
background in real estate that predated his law career, filed 
articles of incorporation for what became a real estate 
development company known as Granada, Inc. (Granada). Larsen 
served as president cf Granada, a closely held corporation owned 
cy him and memrers of nis family. According to Larsen, Granada 
was M inactive11" during tne first few years after incorporation, 
development. The projects ranged from housing developments and 
apartments, to office buildings and a shopping center. The 
projects were mostly concentrated along Utah's Wasatch Front at 
first, but eventually they included real estate developments in 
Arizona and Nevada. The first fifteen or twenty projects were 
also very successful. 
In simple terms, the capital for most of the projects was 
provided by Larsen's law clients, typically doctors and dentists 
for whom he had set up professional corporations and pension 
plans. These clients invested retirement and pension monies in 
various limited partnerships Larsen formed for real estate 
development. Granada served as general partner in many of the 
limited partnerships, and acted as manager in others when a 
different general partner was named. In all, close to one 
hundred real estate limited partnerships were organized.1 
Granada had no employees during the first eight years after 
its incorporation, but hired its first employee in 1979. More 
employees were hired as Granada grew. Larsen said that, with 
this growth, he spent more of his time with Granada, and less 
time with his law practice. Larsen thereupon hired Brian Farr, a 
recently licensed attorney. 
Larsen claims he nired Farr as his own personal attorney to 
advise him in representing his clients, thereby creating an 
attorney-client relationship nested within another attorney-
client relationship. Althougn Larsen disputes that Farr was ever 
an associate, except briefly, he referred several legal natters 
to Farr to be performed on behalf of his clients. Larsen also 
assigned Farr some legal work of a personal nature, such as a 
parKing violation by an office venicle, pro Dono litigation, a 
land sale, and preparing amendments to an unrelated family-
partnership as new family memoers were born. Larsen further 
assigned Farr some Granada-related projects, such as evictions 
and a health plan. 
Larsen supervised Farr's work throughout their working 
"relationship.M Farr reported the hours ne worked to Larsen, wno 
tnen billed the clients. In turn, the clients paid Larsen, and 
Larsen paid Farr for his services through an account m tr.e name 
of Larsen's professional corporation. The Larsen-Farr 
relationship lasted approximately four years. 
1. Of these entities, only the limited partnerships known as The 
Oaks, Ltd., Three Crowns, Baseline, and EFF Fund, Ltd., were 
involved in the forty-two count amended information. 
Larsen and Farr sometimes conferred together with clients. 
According to Farr, during one such meeting, after setting up a 
professional corporation and a pension plan for a doctor and his 
wife, Larsen explained about certain reporting requirements that 
were involved. Larsen informed the clients that an accountant, a 
bank or a specialized pension accounting service could discharge 
those duties. Farr asserted that Larsen discouraged the clients 
from using a bank or an accountant, but recommended that they use 
Professional Pension Services (PPS) , an entity that Larsen said 
dealt exclusively with pension matters. Larsen also told the 
clients that if they were to use PPS, they would like its liquid 
mortgage fund because investments in the fund required no minimum 
deposit and carried no penalty for early withdrawal. It appears 
from the record that PPS was loaning the fund proceeds to 
Granada-related projects. 
Farr claimed that Larsen failed, m recommending PPS, to 
disclose his former ownership of or continuing influence over 
PPS. Farr believed these omissions could put the clients' 
investments at risk. After the meeting, Farr contacted PPS at 
the request of the clients for information about the liquid 
mortgage fund. He learned that PPS did not have an offering 
statement or any agreement regarding the use of the liquid 
mortgage fund. Farr's concerns were further heightened when he 
was unable to find any recorded trust deeds securing the leans. 
After reviewing files at Granada and receiving additional 
information from PPS, Farr discovered that these problems were 
widespread. 
Farr spoke to Larsen about what he had learned and perceived 
to be a problem. Larsen assured him that the matter would be 
resolved. Despite tnese assurances, notning was done. Farr 
continued to press Larsen :cr a resolution and even volunteered 
to handle the matter. Larsen re;ected tne offer, and hired 
outside counsel to research any possible violations of state 
securities laws. As a result cf the growing tension between 
Larsen and Farr, their wcr< relaticnsnip was severed in 1382.~ 
Following the treaxup, Farr continued to be concerned about 
the interests of former "clients," especially their investments 
in Granada. As a result cf wnat he perceived to be ongoing 
securities violations, Farr contacted Constance White cf the Vtan 
Securities Division (Securities division; m 1933. Farr told 
2. Larsen claims that Farr's failure to make partner was the 
reason for the breakup as well as his motive in reporting Larsen 
to the Utah Securities Division, a rather telling statement m 
view of Larsen7s claim that Farr was never even an associate m 
any meaningful sense. 
White what he knew about Granada based on what he had seen, was 
told, or had heard. White then turned the matter over to the 
Securities Division staff for investigation. Later, in 1986, 
Farr was employed by the Attorney General in the Health Division. 
Concurrent with these events, Granada began to experience 
serious cash flow shortages and its investments suffered. Larsen 
claimed he believed Granada was solvent, and sought Securities 
Division approval for a new mortgage fund offering by Granada. 
In early 1987, Larsen learned that the figures he relied on were 
inaccurate. The Securities Division told Larsen that Granada 
would be placed in receivership if Granada did not petition for 
bankruptcy. Granada then petitioned for bankruptcy in February 
1987. 
On October 19, 1988, the State filed a fifty-count criminal 
complaint against Larsen. The complaint alleged that Larsen had 
committed securities fraud and related acts of dishonesty in the 
sale of securities. Larsen was bound over on forty-two counts 
following a motion to amend and a lengthy preliminary hearing. 
Larsen then moved to sever the trial into five parts in order to 
more closely align the victims, dates, transactions, and entities 
involved. The trial court granted the motion and Larsen went to 
trial on the eighteen counts of securities fraud involving EFF 
Fund, Ltd. (EFF Fund or EFF). 
Larsen then moved to disqualify the Attorney General on the 
ground that Farr's subsequent employment with the State, when 
coupled with his previous disclosures to the Securities Division, 
posed a conflict of interest that should have been imputed to the 
entire office of the Attorney General. After a two-day hearing 
in wnich Farr, Larsen, and White testified, the district court 
denied the motion. 
Larsen filed a written opposition to the ruling, and filed 
an interlocutory appeal, ooth of which were denied. Before 
trial, Larsen moved to prohibit testimony about any entities 
other than EFF Fund, but the motion was denied. Larsen also 
moved to prohibit inquiry into tne investigation by the 
Securities Division that led to the eventual suspension of EFF. 
That motion was deferred until trial. After a two-week trial, a 
^ury found Larsen guilty of all eighteen counts. 
DISQUALIFICATION 
A. Attorney-Client Relationship 
Larsen argues that the Attorney General should have been 
disqualified from prosecuting the case against him because Farr's 
employment with the Health Division mandated disqualification 
under the imputed conflict of interest rule. See Utah Rules of 
Professional Conduct Rule 1.10 (1990). Larsen also contends that 
his conviction should be reversed because Farr's disclosures to 
the Securities Division violated certain ethical duties of 
confidentiality owed to Larsen as a former client of Farr. The 
threshold issue of both these arguments is whether an attorney-
client relationship existed. C£. Williams v. Barber. 765 P.2d 
887, 889 (Utah 1988)(threshold inquiry in legal malpractice is 
whether an attorney-client relationship existed). The trial 
court found that Farr was not Larsen's attorney except for a few 
minor transactional matters unrelated to securities or the 
criminal charges against him in this case, and denied Larsen's 
motion to disqualify. 
To prove that the trial court's findings of fact were 
clearly erroneous, "an appellant must marshal all evidence in 
favor of the facts as found by the trial court and then 
demonstrate that even viewing the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the court below, the evidence is insufficient to 
support the findings of fact." Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 
199-200 (Utah 1990). If an appellant fails to marshal the 
evidence, "the appellate court assumes that the record supports 
the findings of the trial court and proceeds to a review of the 
accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law and the 
application of that law in the case." id. at 199. 
Larsen challenges several factual findings of the trial 
court concerning the nature or extent of their professional 
relationship,3 but admits ne "may have fallen somewhat short" in 
3. Larsen challenges the following factual findings on appeal: 
(1) that Farr was an associate of Larsen in the practice of law; 
(2) that Farr occasionally performed legal work for Larsen 
personally; (3) that the legal work involved minor transactions 
unrelated to the matters or issues pending in this prosecution; 
(4) tnat Farr did not represent Larsen while serving common 
clients; (5) that, if an attorney client relationship existed 
between Farr and Larsen, it was related only to minor 
transactional matters, and not to any matter substantially 
related to the prosecution; (6) that Farr was not general counsel 
for Granada; (7) that Farr performed legal work for Granada in a 
(continued..T) 
marshaling the evidence. Larsen even goes so far as to suggest 
that he was prevented from doing so because of page limitations 
imposed upon him.4 Our insistence on compliance with the 
marshaling requirement is not a case of exalting hypertechnical 
adherence to form over substance. HA reviewing court is entitled 
to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited 
and is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may 
dump the burden of argument and research." State v. Bishop. 753 
P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988)(quoting Williamson v. Qpsahl. 92 111. 
App. 3d 1087, 1089, 416 N.E.2d 783, 784 (1981)). The marshaling 
requirement provides the appellate court the basis from which to 
conduct a meaningful review of facts challenged on appeal. See 
Wright v. Westside Nursery. 787 P.2d 508, 512 n.2 (Utah App. 
1990)(the purpose of the marshaling requirement is to spare 
appellate courts the onerous burden of combing through the record 
in search of supporting factual matters). 
Larsen argued only "selected evidence favorable to [his] 
position," Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.. 817 P.2d 739, 800 (Utah 
1991) , without presenting any of the evidence supporting the 
trial court's findings. Larsen's approach "does not begin to 
meet the marshaling burden (he) must carry." Id. Because Larsen 
failed to marshal evidence in support of the trial court's 
findings and show how they are clearly erroneous, we affirm the 
factual findings of the trial court that Farr was not Larsen's 
personal attorney, except in a few minor transactional matters 
unrelated to this prosecution.5 
3. (...continued) 
few minor matters; (3) that the work was unrelated to the matters 
and issues pending in this prosecution; and (9) that Farr's 
representation ceased prior to 1933. 
4. Larsen was allowed to file an cverlength brief of 81 pages 
after his request to file a 120-page orief was denied. The 31-
page brief was supplemented by five volumes of supporting addenda 
that made extensive reference to memoranda of points and 
authorities in the briefs filed below, thereby, circumventing any 
size restrictions. Given this leeway, the argument that Larsen 
was prevented from marshaling is somewhat disingenuous. 
5. Larsen asserts that it was his suo^ective belief that Farr 
was his personal attorney in all things, out fails to present any 
evidence of conduct that would warrant an implied attorney-client 
relationship. See, e.g.. Maraulies v. Uochurch, 696 P.2d 1195, 
1200 (Utah 1985)(an attorney-client relationship was implied 
where the law firm had represented a limited partnership in which 
the would-be clients had invested); 3reuer-Harrison, Inc. v. 
(continued... J 
B. Substantial Factual Relationship Test 
Having affirmed the trial court's finding regarding the 
limited nature of the attorney-client relationship between Farr 
and Larsen, we review its decision to not disqualify the Attorney 
General. The parties agree that the applicable standard 
governing disqualification is set forth in Rule 1.10(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, which provides as follows 
(with our emphasis): 
When a lawyer becomes associated with a 
firm, the firm may not knowingly represent a 
person in the same or a substantially 
factually related matter in wnich that 
lawyer, or tirm with which the lawyer has 
associated, had previously represented a 
client whose interests are materially adverse 
to that person and about whom the lawyer had 
acquired information protected by Rules 1.6 
and 1.9(b) that is material to the matter. 
Whether the matters in which Farr represented Larsen were 
'•the same or substantially factually related" to the current case 
is a critical factor in the disqualification calculus. The trial 
court found that Farr's representation of Larsen was limited to a 
handful of legal matters unrelated to the securities or criminal 
charges against him. 
On appeal, Larsen offered no argument that the matters in 
which the trial court found Farr had represented him were the 
same or substantially related to the matters for which 
disqualification is new sougnt. Unless a substantial factual 
relationship is shown cetween the natters, disqualification is 
not required under the rule cecause tne most basic element is not 
present. Our conclusion tnat there is no substantial 
relationship is supported by the fact that Farr learned of the 
perceived securities problems outside tne scope of tne legal 
representation of Larsen expressly undertaken. When Farr 
5. (...continued) 
Combe, 799 P.2d 716, "27-23 (Utah App. 1990) (although an 
attorney-client relationsnip may be i-.plied by the parties' 
conduct, a would-be client's belief that a professional 
relationship exists must have been reasonably induced by the 
attorney's conduct). Cf. Atkinson v. IHC HOSPS., Inc., 798 P.2d 
733, 735 (Utah 1990)(courts consider who the attorney claimed to 
have represented as snown by the pleadings and other documents; 
the existence of an employment contract or retainer agreement; 
and the parties' admissions about the relationship)". 
confronted Larsen about the problems, Larsen rejected Farr's 
offer to handle the matter and hired outside counsel. 
Absent a substantial factual relationship between the former 
and present matters, no attorney-client relationship can be 
imposed on Farr with respect to this litigation, and "there could 
be no conflict of interest created" by Farr's subsequent 
employment with the Attorney General, Marcrulies v. Upchurch. 696 
P.2d 1195, 1200 (Utah 1985), Accordingly, we conclude that, 
inasmuch as disqualification of the Attorney General was not 
mandated under Rule 1.10(b) of the Utah Rules of Professional 
Conduct, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to 
allow the Attorney General to remain as counsel. Id. 
Further, we also reject Larsen's argument that the mere 
appearance of impropriety is sufficient to overturn his 
conviction. In State v. Ford, 793 P.2d 397 (Utah App. 1990), 
this court said that a criminal defendant "is not automatically 
entitled to a reversal of his conviction" merely because of an 
apparent violation of a rule of professional conduct. Id. at 
400. If Farr violated any ethical rules, the "appropriate remedy 
lies with the disciplinary arm of the Utah State Bar." Id. 
III. EXPERT OPINION 
Larsen argues that the court erred in allowing the former 
registration chief of the Securities Division, an attorney now 
serving as a securities examiner in Nevada, to offer expert 
opinion testimony concerning the "materiality" of information not 
disclosed to investors. Larsen asserts that the opinion was 
improper legal testimony, not factual testimony. Whether or not 
the information was "material" is an element of securities 
fraud.6 
6. It is unlawful for any person, in 
connection with the offer, sale, or purchase 
of any security, directl/ or indirectly to: 
(1) employ any device, scheme, 
or artifice to defraud; 
(2) make any untrue statement 
of a material fact or to omit to 
state a material fact necessary in 
order to make the statements made, 
in the light of the circumstances 
under which they are nade, not 
misleading; or 
It is within the discretion of the trial court to determine 
the suitability of expert testimony in a particular case, State 
v. Clavton. 646 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1982), and we will not 
reverse that determination on appeal in the "absence of a clear 
showing of abuse." Lamb v. Bancrart. 525 P.2d 602, 607-08 (Utah 
1974). Expert testimony is suitable if it will "assist the trier 
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 
issue . . . ." Utah R. Evid. 702. In general, expert testimony 
is suitable in securities fraud cases because the technical 
nature of securities is not within the knowledge of the average 
layman or a subject within common experience and would help the 
jury understand the issues before them. See Dixon v. Stewart. 
658 P.2d 591, 597 (Utah 1982). 
Under Rule 704 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, expert opinion 
is "not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be 
decided by the trier of fact".7 Despite the appropriateness of 
expert testimony on an ultimate issue, Rule 704 was not intended 
to allow experts to give legal conclusions. See Davidson v. 
Prince, 813 P.2d 1225, 1231 (Utah App. 1991)(citing Owen v. Kerr-
McGee Corp., 698 F.2d 236, 240 (5th Cir. 1983)). 
The danger of allowing expert opinion couched as a legal 
standard is that "the jurors will turn to the expert, rather than 
to the judge, for guidance on the applicable law." 3 Jack B. 
Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence. J 704[02]. 
See also First Sec. Bank v. Banberrv Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253, 
1258 (Utah 1989)(legal duty owed by trust deed trustee to trustor 
is question of law to be determined by the court, and not 
question of fact suitable for testimony by expert in real estate 
law); Ashton v. Ashton. 733 P.2d 147, 153 (Utah 1987) (attorney's 
expert opinion as to effect of joint tenant's conveyance was 
inadmissible statement of law). The determination of whether 
expert opinion embraces an ultimate factual issue or constitutes 
a legal conclusion is a difficult call because "[t]here is no 
bright line between permissible questions under Rule 704 and 
6. (...continued) 
(3) engage in any act, 
practice, or course of business 
which operates or would operate as 
a fraud or deceit upon any person. 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (1989): 
7. Black's Law Dictionary 1057 (6th ed. 1991) defines an 
ultimate issue as "[tjhat question which must finally be answered 
as, for-example, the defendant's negligence is the .ultimate issue 
in a personal injury action." 
those that call for overbroad legal responses." Davidson, 813 
P.2d at 1231.8 
The distinction between a factual evidentiary showing of 
materiality and impermissible opinion on the legal question of 
materiality was underscored in United States v. Lueben, 812 F.2d 
179, 183 (5th Cir. 1987). In Lueben. the Fifth Circuit held that 
expert opinion on materiality was admissible as being fact-
oriented. The court reasoned that whether certain false 
statements would have had Mthe capacity to influence" a loan 
officer as a factual element of the government's case was 
distinguishable from the question of whether the statements were 
legally ••material." 1£. at 184. The government was required to 
make an initial factual showing of materiality as an element of 
its case. The Fifth Circuit ruled that the district court, 
therefore, committed reversible error in not allowing expert 
testimony since the defendant would have been entitled to a 
directed verdict of acquittal if the government was unable to 
prove each element of its case. Id. at 185. 
Although Lueben involved a prosecution for making false 
statements in connection with a loan application and tax returns, 
rather than securities violations, the case illustrates the 
distinction between permissible fact-oriented questions as to 
materiality and impermissible legal conclusions referred to in 
the cases cited by Larsen.' Accordingly, we are persuaded by 
Lueben that use of the term "material" may be admitted as 
permissible fact-oriented testimony. Upon review of the record, 
we conclude that the expert in this case used the term "material" 
in a factual sense. 
3. See State v. Span. 170 Utah Adv. Rep. 16, 17-18, 26 n.l (Utah 
1991)(arson investigator testified that fire was intentionally 
set); American Concept Ins. Co. v. Lochhead, 751 P.2d 271, 273 
(Utah App. 1988)(expert could submit affidavit as to ultimate 
issues of lack of good faith and fair dealing in suit for 
tortious interference with business relations). See also Davis 
v. Mason County. 927 F.2d 1473, 1484-85 (9th Cir. 1991)(police 
expert could testify that county sheriff was "reckless" in 
failing to adequately tram his deputies, and that there was a 
causal link between this recklessness and plamtiffs's m]uries) ; 
United States v. Nixon. 918 F.2d 395, 905 (11th Cir. 1990)(police 
detective could use the term "conspiracy," since testimony was 
factual and not a legal conclusion). 
9. See United States v. SCOP, 846 F.2d 135 (2nd Cir. 1988); 
Adalman v. Baker, Watts & Co., 807 F.2d 359 (4th Cir. 1986); and 
Marx & Co., Inc. v. Diner's Club, Inc.. 550 F.2d 505 (2nd Cir. 
Since the State is required to prove all essential elements 
of a crime, and materiality is an element of the offense charged 
in this case, there was no abuse of discretion in allowing the 
expert testimony. See State v. Flore2. 777 P.2d 452, 456 (Utah 
1989)(state has a right to introduce evidence on every element). 
Furthermore, any confusion that might have been created by the 
casual use of the term "material" and its legal definition could 
have been corrected with a jury instruction. See Conger v. Tel 
Tech, Inc., 798 P.2d 279, 283 (Utah App. 1990); State v. Ortiz. 
782 P.2d 959, 962 (Utah App. 1989). 
IV. MOTIONS IN LIMINE 
A. EFF Fund 
Larsen brought a motion in limine to prohibit the State from 
introducing testimony concerning any entities other than EFF Fund 
on the ground that any such evidence was irrelevant to the 
eighteen counts of securities fraud severed for trial.10 The 
State asserted that the evidence was relevant because: EFF had 
been set up similarly to the other entities; Larsen had told 
investors that EFF would be operated the same way as PPS; the 
claim as to similarity was an inducement for investment; and the 
partnerships all received money from EFF because of their 
structural similarity. 
The State also claimed that Larsen had promised the 
investors that the loans were secured by promissory notes, but 
that these documents were only partially completed or non-
existent. Although the trial court instructed the State that it 
could not delve into specific acts of misconduct, the court 
denied Larsen's motion, stating that the government was entitled 
to pursue its theory of the case. On appeal, Larsen claims his 
conviction should be reversed because of prejudicial error 
inasmuch as the evidence was irrelevant and immaterial. 
"Relevant evidence" is defined as that "evidence having a 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence 
to the determination of the action more probable or less 
probable" and is admissible unless excluded. Utah R. Evid. 401 
"10. In particular, Larsen objected to trie State's inquiries into 
how Granada raised money to acquire and develop properties; how 
the liquid mortgage fund or its counterpart, the PPS fund, 
operated; how EFF money was used; what limitations were imposed 
on the fund; whether EFF was ever investigated; the significance 
of certain portions of a registration statement; and which 
nmnerties received monies from EFF. 
and 402. See generally State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313, 1316 (Utah 
1986)• Rule 403 states that "relevant evidence may be excluded 
if its probative value is found to be substantially outweighed by 
the potential for unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste 
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.11 Utah 
R. Evid. 403 (emphasis added). Thus, in determining whether 
relevant evidence should be excluded, H[e]vidence that tends to 
prove an element of the crime is admissible. Evidence which goes 
to general disposition or that is unfairly prejudicial is not 
admissible." State v. Jamison, 767 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah App. 
1989) . 
The explanations given by the State regarding the relevance 
of the other entities to EFF were cogent to the legal test of 
relevance because they tended to make the existence of facts 
concerning the alleged securities violations more or less 
probable than without the evidence. The trial court had a legal 
basis, therefore, to admit the evidence. See State v. Ramirez. 
159 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 16 n.3 (1990). 
Larsen does not challenge the merits of any of the reasons 
given by the State as to relevance. Larsen's claim as to 
relevance is based solely on the grounds that the EFF Fund, the 
liquid mortgage fund, and the other partnerships were separate 
entities. Larsen mistakenly asserts that the trial court's 
severance of those claims bars any discussion of those entities. 
The relevance of these other entities to the other charges, as 
tne trial court pointed out, does not preclude their relevance to 
the EFF Fund. 
Larsen also made no argument on how evidence of the other 
entities confused the issues or misled the jury. The trial 
court's cautionary instruction prohibiting the State from delving 
into other acts of misconduct adequately balanced the apparent 
concerns for unfair prejudice. The trial court, therefore, did 
not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence. 
B. Investigation by the Securities Division 
Larsen also brought a motion in limine to prevent testimony 
regarding an investigation of Granada by the Securities Division, 
claiming that the evidence would be "highly prejudicial." 
-Without holding a hearing or ruling on the motion, the trial 
court indicated in a minute entry that consideration of the 
matter would be deferred until trial. The testimony was later 
admitted at trial over Larsen's objection. On appeal, Larsen 
contends the testimony should have been excluded as impermissible 
character evidence under Rule 404 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
•• [I]n order to preserve a contention of 
error in the admission of evidence for 
appeal, a defendant must raise a timely 
objection to the trial court in clear and 
specific terms. Where there [is] no clear or 
specific objection on the basis of character 
evidence or unfair prejudice and the specific 
ground for objection [is] not clear from the 
context of the question or the testimony, the 
theory cannot be raised on appeal." 
State v. Schreuder. 726 P.2d 1215, 1222 (Utah 1986)(footnote 
omitted). 
Although Larsen claims he objected "at every opportunity at 
trial," no Rule 404 character evidence objections were made. 
Larsen objected to the State asking questions in improper form, 
assuming facts not in evidence, asking for irrelevant and 
immaterial evidence, and asking for evidence which, although 
relevant, should have been excluded under Rule 403. 
Larsen's objections as to form, relevance, materiality, 
leading nature and so on do not call the court's attention to 
impermissible character evidence and the theory is not clear from 
the context. See State v. Eldredae. 773 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah), 
cert, denied. U.S. , 110 S. Ct. 62 (1989); Schreuder. 726 
P. 2d at 1222. Because no proper objection was made, Larsen has 
not preserved the issue for appeal and we do not address the 
issue further. 
V. REMAINING ISSUES 
A. Specific Intent 
Larsen argues that the trial court's refusal to give his 
proposed jury instructions on specific intent was reversible 
error. Although a criminal defendant is entitled to have the 
jury instructed on his theory of the crime if there is any basis 
in the evidence to support that theory, ]ury instructions should 
not incorrectly or misleadmgly state the law. State v. Aly. 782 
P.2d 549, 550 (Utah App. 1989)). 
The common law terms "general intent" and "specific intent" 
have not been used in the Utah criminal code since substantive 
amendments in 1973. See State v. Calamity, 735 P.2d 39, 43 (Utah 
1987). See also Utah Code Ann. $ 76-2-102 (1990). 
The Utah Code specifies wilfulness as the culpable mental 
any provision of this chapter . . . or willfully violates any 
rules or order under this chapter . . . shall upon conviction be 
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than three 
years, or both." Utah Code Ann. $ 61-1-21 (1990)(emphasis 
added). The trial court, therefore, properly instructed the ]ury 
that the culpable mental state for the crime of securities fraud 
is "willfulness," rather than specific intent as proposed by 
Larsen. The court defined willfulness as follows: 
You are instructed that a person engages in 
conduct intentionally or with intent or 
willfully, with respect to the nature of his 
conduct or to the result of his conduct, when 
it is his conscious desire to engage in the 
conduct or cause the result. 
The instruction on willfulness mirrors the statutory 
definition of willfulness under Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(1) 
(1990). Moreover, because "willfully" is alternatively listed 
with "intentionally" or "with intent," the instruction is not 
inconsistent with State v. Facer, 552 P.2d 110, 111 (Utah 1976) 
(crime of securities fraud does not require element of loss and 
causal connection, since the crime is complete under section 61-
1-1(1) if defendant intentionally employs any device, scheme or 
artifice to defraud). Inasmuch as willfulness is the culpable 
mental state, a separate instruction on specific intent was 
unnecessary. 
B. Other Jury Instructions and Leading Questions 
We have also reviewed the remaining issues raised on appeal 
and deem them to be without merit. In our discretion, we do not 
address them further. See State v. Carter. 776 P.2d 886, 883 
(Utah 1989). 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Farr's subsequent employment with the Attorney General did 
not mandate disqualification because there was no attorney-client 
relationship between him and Larsen that would have created a 
conflict of interest. Expert opinion on the issue of materiality 
was admissible as fact-oriented testimony concerning an element 
of the government's prima facie case. The trial court did not 
.abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of entities other than 
EFF Fund because of their relevance to the issues of securities 
fraud. Larsen did not object to the character evidence 
complained of, and thereby failed to preserve the issue for 
appeal. The culpable mental state of securities fraud is 
willfulness and the trial court's instruction on the element was 
proper. 
^^Accordingly, Larsen's conviction and sentence are affirmed. 
Russell W. Bench, 
Presiding Judge 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
C. DEAN LARSEN, 
Defendant. 
ooOoo 
Pursuant to Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
C. Dean Larsen, by and through his counsel of record, hereby 
requests that the following jury instructions be given by the Court 
in this case. 
Further, the Defendant requests leave to offer such other 
additional instructions as, during the course of the trial, become 
appropriate. 
1. The Court's usual instructions on the following subjects: 
a. Verdict/Juryfs responsibility. 
b. Province of the court. 
c. Province of the jury. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 4 
The crimes charged in this case are serious crimes which 
require proof of specific intent before the Defendant can be 
convicted. Specific intent, as the term implies, means more than 
the general intent to commit the act. To establish specific intent 
the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
Defendant willfully did an act which the law forbids, or willfully 
failed to do an act which the law requires, purposely intending to 
violate the law. Such intent may be determined from all the facts 
and circumstances surrounding the case. 
1 U.C.A. §§ 61-1-1(2) and 61-1-21. 
2 1 Devitt and Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, 
§ 14.03 (3d ed. 1977). 
3 Troutman v. U.S., 100 F.2d 628, 632-33 (10th Cir. 1939). 
4 Sparrow v. U.S., 402 F.2d 826, 828-29 (10th Cir. 1968). 
5 Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 693 (10th Cir. 1976), 
cert.denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977). 
6 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976). 
7 U.S. v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 11-12 (1976). 
8 Liparota v. U.S., 471 U.S. 419, 422-23, 433-34 (1985). 
9
 State v. Facer, 552 P.2d 110, 111 (Utah 1976). 
10 State v. Haas, 675 P.2d 673, 678 (Ariz. 1983). 
11 U.S. v. Pearlstein, 576 F.2d 531, 537 (3d Cir. 1978). 
12 U.S. v. Payne, 474 F.2d 603, 604 (9th Cir. 1973). 
1AT-
001 
13 U.S. v. Danser, 26 F.R.D. 580, 588 (D.C. Mass. 1959), affirmed 
Danser v. U.S., 281 F.2d 492 (1st Cir. 1960). 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 5 
Under Utah law, a person engages in conduct "willfully" with 
respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, 
when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the 
conduct or cause the result. 
Thus, an act is done "willfully" if done voluntarily and 
intentionally, and with the specific intent to do something the law 
forbids; that is to say with bad purpose either to disobey or to 
disregard the law. 
An omission or a failure to act is done "willfully" if done 
voluntarily and intentionally, and with the specific intent to fail 
to do something the law requires; that is to say with bad purpose 
either to disobey or to disregard the law. 
In this case, the bad purpose would be the specific intent i^cf jjfl' 
defraud. *- ^ ^h^ 
i \ ^ y 
Instructions, 
1 U.C.A. § 76-2-103(1). 
2 1 Devitt and Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice &il 
§ 14.06 (3d ed. 1977). 
3 See citations from previous requested Instruction No. 4. 
4 U.S. v. A. & P. Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121 (1958). 
5 Morissette v. U.S., 342 U.S. 246, 250, 252, 264 (1952). 
6 Screws v. U.S., 325 U.S. 91, 101-107 (1945). 
7 Hartzel v. U.S.. 322 U.S. 680, 686 (1944). 
8 U.S. v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 303 U.S. 239, 242-243 (1939). 
9 Murdock v. U.S., 290 U.S. 389, 393-396 (1933). 
10 Hagner v. U.S., 285 U.S. 427, 429 (1932). GQX^oJ 
11 Ellis v. U.S., 206 U.S. 246, 257 (1906). 
12 Marteney v. U.S., 218 F.2d 258, 263 (10th Cir. 1954), 
cert.denied 348 U.S. 953 (1955). 
INSTRUCTION NO. 30 
You are instructed that a representation made by the Defendant 
in good faith constitutes a complete defense to a charge of 
Securities Fraud. Thus, the Defendant is not guilty of Securities 
Fraud if he had a good faith intention to carry out a promise or 
representation at the time he made the promise or representation. 
Even if the representation were false or based purely upon specula-
tion and caused an investor to rely upon the representation as 
true, it does not constitute Securities Fraud if the Defendant made 
the representation in good faith. 
Good faith, as commonly used, means a belief or state of mind 
denoting honesty of purpose, or freedom from intention to defraud. 
If the evidence in this case leaves you with a reasonable 
doubt whether the Defendant made a representation in good faith, 
then you should find the Defendant not guilty of Securities Fraud 
in regard to that representation. 
1 Sparrow v. U.S., 402 F.2d 826, 828-29 (10th Cir. 1968). 
2
 U.S. v. Cronic, 839 F.2d 1401, 1403 (10th Cir. 1988). 
3 Frank v. U.S., 220 F.2d 559, 564-65 (10th Cir. 1955). 
4 U.S. v. Bane, 583 F.2d 832 (6th Cir. 1978). 
5 State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 211 (Utah 1985). 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COINTY. STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
C. DEAN LARSEN, 
Defendant. 
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY 
CRIMINAL NO. 891900927 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1 
You are instructed that the defendant C» DEAN LARSExN1 is 
charged by the Information which has been duly filed with the 
commission of 
alleges 
SECURITIES FRAUD (18 COUNTS) 
COUNT 1 
The Information 
SECURITIES FRAUD. On or about January 7, 1986, in Salt Lake 
County, Utah and in violation of Utah Code Ann., Section 61-1-
1(2) and 61-1-21, the defendant, C. DEAN LARSEN, in connection 
with the offer or sale of any security to Carles Flamand, 
directly or indirectly, willfully made an untrue statement of a 
material fact or omitted to state a material fact necessary in 
order to make the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they are made, not misleading. 
0CJ-X33 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
You are instructed that under the laws of the State of Utah 
a person commits securities fraud, if, in connection with the 
offer or sale of any security, either directly or indirectly, he 
willfully makes or causes to be made any untrue statement of a 
material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in 
order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances 
under which they were made, not misleading* 
INSTRUCTION NO. If 
You are instructed that a person engages in conduct 
intentionally or with intent or willfully, with respect to the 
nature of his conduct or to the result of his conduct, when it is 
his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or 
cause the result. 
INSTRUCTION NO. UA 
You are instructed that ignorance or mistake of fact which 
disproves the culpable mental state is a defense to any 
prosecution for that crime. 
The culpable mental state for the crime of securities fraud 
is "willfulness.M 
lioXt'Jiwvi 
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then a Certificate of Probable Cause should issue. 
Because if a question is close enough, it would be 
inherently unfair in our democratic society for someone 
to be imprisoned for months and months and months, some 
cases years, I suppose, for some Appellate Courts to deal 
with problems. We don't have that problem, fortunately, 
in the State of Utah. But nevertheless, that is a matter 
that we have great concern about. I believe that all 
things considered, all of the points brought up, but 
particularly the fact that this is a brand new statute, 
and the statute, the main charging statute itself is not 
very — it is not very clear because it does not state 
whether one should intentionally or willfully make the 
statement but then confuses it by later on saying "The 
punishment will be for one who willfully does it." It 
sets forth what the penalty will be. 
Now, I do not believe — I believe I followed 
the State and 61-1-1 and combined it with 61-1-21 to find 
willfulness and I think that is the correct 
interpretation. But there is an argument that could be 
made, that since the charging statute itself mentioned 
nothing, it should have been specific intent. And that 
alone, over this past weekend, has given me my greatest 
concern. And I feel that in all fairness that it is a 
matter that must be resolved by the Appellate Court and 
47 
therefore I am going to grant the Petition for 
Certificate of Probable Cause. 
I grant the Certificate of Probable Cause, 
which brings us to the next point of — that is only part 
of the battle won as far as the state is concerned. Now, 
the question is, is he a security risk and should there 
be bail and, if so, how much? 
MR. KELLER: May I address that, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: You want to do it at this time, you 
may proceed. 
MR. KELLER: Very good, Your Honor. Your 
Honor, Mr. Larsen came to me in August of 1988. At that 
time the Attorney General's Office investigation had been 
several months, even years in occurrence, and asked me to 
represent him. He was charged October 19th of 1988. He 
has made every single court appearance he has ever been 
requested to make. He has been on Pretrial Release 
through Pretrial Services and has never had a problem. 
He has been trusted and he has discharged that trust 
faithfully. He is a family man with eight children, 
lived in Utah all of his life. He is a very religious 
man. His family has been very supportive of him. There 
would be absolutely no reason in the world for him to 
change a course of conduct that he has undergone for the 
last two and a half years. 
48 
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Q Are you professional licensed? 
A Yes, I am licensed with the State Bars of Utah 
and Nevada. 
Q And where are you currently employed? 
A I am employed with the Secretary of State's 
Office in Nevada as the Securities Administrator. 
Q How long have you been employed there? 
A Been there since '87. 
Q And where did you work before you came to the 
Nevada Securities Commission in '87? 
A I worked with the Utah Securities Division 
which is part of the Department of Business Regulation. 
Now it is called the Department of Commerce. 
Q Did you have a title when you were working with 
the Utah Securities Division? 
A Yes, sir. I was chief of registration. 
Q Had you had some training before you achieved 
that title? 
A When I was first hired by the State, I worked 
as a securities examiner. 
Q What does a securities examiner do? 
A An examiner reviews the registration forms that 
are filed, all the prospectuses that are part of 
offerings. 
Q Tell the jury what the chief of registration 
39 
Q Did you also touch upon disclosures with regard 
to limited offerings or private placements? 
A Yes, various aspects of those. For the most 
part, limited offerings, the disclosure in a limited 
offering, is established by me and the SEC in their 
guidelines and regulations. There are gaps in those 
disclosure requirements, and that is where the committee 
established some rules. 
Q Do you feel that you are familiar with both the 
state and the federal requirements of disclosure in 
limited offerings? 
A Yes, because we were examiners, we were 
required to keep one eye on federal requirements and 
another eye on the state requirements. 
Q What securities — Before we leave the North 
American Securities Administration Association, let me 
ask you how long you have been associated with that 
organization. 
A Since working with Utah. So I started with 
Utah in 1982. It has been eight years. 
Q What seminars or special training might you 
have had in the course of these eight years that helped 
you in your employment? 
A Number of seminars. The SEC sponsors several 
seminars during the year. The North American Securities 
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compilation of the disclosure that will go to an 
investor. That disclosure should be everything the 
investor really should know or would consider important 
in order to make an investment decision. 
Q And were you responsible to your employer to 
determine the adequacy of those disclosure documents that 
you reviewed? 
A Yes. 
Q And what are the types of things that you would 
look for in your examination of prospectuses or Private 
Placement Memorandums? 
A There is some basic disclosure that is required 
under state requirements and the federal requirements. 
There needs to be a disclosure about the owners, the 
people that are putting the things together, that are 
going to be running the business. You need to disclose 
what their background is, what their qualifications are, 
what problems they may have had in the past. 
Q Why is that important? 
A Well, because your investment decision is — it 
is important because the people that are going to be 
running the operation are the people that are pretty much 
going to dictate the success or failure of the operation. 
So you need to know about those people. 
Q What else are you concerned with when you 
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the division if there is problems with the filings and it 
is not accepted. The division, if problems are 
discovered, we then prepare a deficiency letter, as it is 
called, and submit it to the correspondent. 
Q Now, turn, if you would please, to the fourth 
page in the document and can you explain to the jury what 
that document is. 
A This is the cover page of this prospectus. The 
prospectus again is the document that is supposed to 
contain all of the material disclosures that is intended 
to go to investors. 
Q How large was the prospectus, do you remember? 
A Well, the prospectus, including exhibits, 
actually was a couple of binders. 
Q Briefly, will you explain, if you would, what 
determines what should be disclosed in the prospectus 
side to be used in connection with the sale of securities 
side? 
A In determining disclosures, there are specific 
guidelines for what needs to be disclosed in every 
offering and those are further established by state law 
and, of course, federal law. Beyond those established 
guidelines, the person reviewing the registration 
statement or prospectus would have to make a judgment 
call as to whether or not under the circumstances 
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1 I additional disclosures need to be made. 
2 I Q And do these disclosures vary from offering to 
3 | offering? 
4 I A Yes. 
5 I Q What is the standard if a new angle comes up, 
6 | how do you determine whether or not that is disclosed in 
7 J the prospectus? 
8 I A Well, again, you would look for any kind of 
9 guidelines that may establish a precedent and then you 
10 I just very carefully look at the operation and you 
11 I determine whether or not there is a specific piece of 
12 information that an investor would consider important in 
13 J making a decision. And then if you determine that there 
14 J is some information, then you insist it be disclosed. 
15 I Q What is the intended use of the prospectus? 
16 I Who gets the prospectus? 
17 J A The investor is supposed to receive the 
18 I prospectus. This is all the representations or this is 
19 J suppose to contain all of the representations that the 
20 I investor should receive and should be relied on in making 
21 J an investment decision. 
22 Q So this document would contain those important 
23 facts that you talked about earlier an investor should 
24 know? 
25 A Yes, it should contain all of the material 
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A 
Q 
security? 
Yes. 
Are you familiar with those instruments of 
A Yes. 
Q Now, we take for granted the prospectus's 
language on this point, but investors were told words, in 
fact, that promissory notes existed evidencing the debt 
and then they were — in fact, no such promissory notes 
existed. Do you have an opinion as to whether or not the 
disclosure would be important to make in this prospectus? 
A Yes, it would. 
MR. KELLER: Objection. Your Honor, may I 
suggest that is immaterial to the issues before the 
Court, the question as to whether or not it is important 
in this prospectus. 
THE COURT: Overruled. He has answered. 
Q (By Mr. Griffin) So this disclosure is proper 
in this prospectus if we assume the facts? 
A Very proper, yes, essential. 
THE COURT: Is this a good time to break? 
MR. GRIFFIN: This is a good time to break, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: We will take our noon recess. We 
are in recess until 1:30. 
(At 12 noon, Court recessed until 1:30 p.m.) 
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Exhibit F. I am looking about four pages in. The pages 
are numbered back there on the exhibit. It is page No. 2 
I want to call your attention to. And would you please 
read the language in paragraph small b up at the top of 
the page? 
A "The application to be submitted to the 
Investment Manager by the Partnership shall include (if 
not already in the Investment Manager's possession) at 
least the following material.M 
Q Now, read the indented paragraph Roman numeral 
four. 
A MA form of note and trust deed or mortgage (or 
amendment thereto in the case of an application for a 
Material Amendment to an existing loan) containing the 
proposed terms of the loan (or amendment)." 
Q Thank you. Now, Mr. Cook, did you understand 
in your review of the Private Placement Memorandum the 
relationship that the investment manager had to EFF, 
Ltd.? Did you understand what the investment manager was 
supposed to do? 
A Yes. 
Q Now, considering what you have just read, Mr. 
Cook, if promissory notes never existed as represented in 
the Private Placement Memorandum, do you have an idea as 
to whether or not it would be proper to use this 
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memorandum to sell interest in EFF, Ltd. once the seller 
knew that such notes did not exist? 
MR. KELLER: Objection, it is leading, Your 
Honor. Secondly, under Rule 702 it is not a subject 
normally necessary for expert testimony. As I previously 
argued to the Court, it is inappropriate to ask such 
question. The jury can read the information and make its 
own conclusion. 
THE COURT: Overruled, the witness may answer. 
That may be answered yes or no, whether you have an 
opinion. 
THE WITNESS: Would you ask the question again? 
Q (By Mr. Griffin) Yes. If promissory notes 
never existed as represented in the Private Placement 
Memorandum, do you have an opinion as to whether or not 
it would be appropriate or proper to use this document in 
selling investments in EFF, Ltd. once the seller knew 
that notes didn't exist? 
A It would not be proper. 
Q If this memorandum were used to make initial 
sales to investors and then subsequently the seller knew 
that the promissory notes did not exist, what if anything 
would be required before the seller could make additional 
sales to those same investors? 
MR. KELLER: Objection, same basis. 
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THE COURT: Overruled. You may answer. 
THE WITNESS: When there is a material change 
in the operation of the company, in most cases — well, 
what should happen is that an amendment should be made to 
the prospectus for future offerees. But also, people who 
have invested in the offering should be given a chance to 
review the material change in the company and decide 
whether or not they want to invest in that company. 
Q (By Mr. Griffin) And will you tell the Court, 
please, whether or not amending this type of document is 
a common or uncommon practice. 
A It is very common. 
Q Do you review those amendments from time to 
time that take place in the securities industry? 
A Yes. 
Q And I believe that you testified, Mr. Cook, 
that you do not ordinarily review Private Placement 
Memorandums, but you do so on occasion? 
A Yes. 
Q And have you had an opportunity to review that 
document more than once? 
A Yes, in preparation for the testimony, yes. 
Q Let's say, Mr. Cook, that you had an 
opportunity to review this Private Placement Memorandum 
before it was used in sales. And let's say you knew the 
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following about the offering: Let's say that you knew 
that Mr. Larsen had given to the general partner's wife 
an interest in another partnership valued at 
approximately $175,000 in connection with his undertaking 
as a general partner. And this would be to indemnify him 
against losses he might incur as a general partner. Do 
you have an opinion as to whether or not that particular 
fact situation should be disclosed? 
MR. KELLER: Objection. Your Honor, may we 
approach the bench. 
THE COURT: You may. 
(Off the record discussion between Court and 
counsel.) 
THE COURT: The objection is sustained and you 
may continue with your examination. 
MR. GRIFFIN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
Q (By Mr. Griffin) Mr. Cook, let's take a 
situation where you have a limited partnership and there 
is an asset such as an interest in another limited 
partnership that is valued at approximately $175,000 that 
is given to the general partner by another individual in 
order to indemnify the general partner against his losses 
that he might incur as general partner of that limited 
partnership. Now, do you have an opinion as to whether 
or not in the offering documents those facts ought to be 
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Mr. 
Q 
Cook? 
A 
PHOTOGRAPHER: Yes, 
THE COURT: You may 
MR. GRIFFIN: Thank 
(By Mr. Griffin) Do 
Yes, I do. 
I understand the rules. 
proceed. 
you, Your Honor. 
you recollect the facts, 
Q Do you have an opinion as to whether or not 
those facts ought to be disclosed in an offering document 
similar to that one? 
A Yes, I would consider that material information 
that an investor would like to know. 
Q You had talked earlier about compensation to 
insiders. Does that fall in that category? 
A Yes, it is compensation but it also goes to 
exactly what the general partners have at risk, whether 
or not they have an incentive to put forth every effort 
to make the operation successful. 
Q Now, assume also that you are examining a 
Private Placement Memorandum, if you will, with regard to 
a limited partnership. And you uncover that the general 
partner is actually not going to make the day-to-day 
decisions in that limited partnership. That will be 
delegated to someone else to make the important decisions 
and the day-to-day decisions. Would you want that to be 
disclosed as well? 
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A Yes. Again, that would be very important for 
an investor to know. The limited partners, or the 
investors in a limited partnership look to the general 
partner for the operation, the success of the company. 
And the general partner is probably the most important 
part of the limited partnership. And if that general 
partner is, in fact, not the true general partner, that 
would be important for an investor to know. 
Q You said that you understood the role of Equity 
Terra, the investment manager in this particular limited 
partnership. 
A I have read the prospectus and I know what it 
says about Equity Terra. 
Q Let me put this question to you. Again, assume 
that you are looking at a limited partnership and a 
Private Placement Memorandum, and there was an investment 
manager that was supposed to make sure that certain 
criteria were fulfilled before loans were made from the 
limited partnership funds. And assume, if you will, that 
the investment manager never met, never operated, never 
exercised his prerogative or made a recommendation, would 
you want those facts disclosed in a disclosure document 
to investors? 
MR. KELLER: Objection. Your Honor, the 
hypothetical is irrelevant to this particular case. I 
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would go further if the Court would allow me. 
THE COURT: You may come to the bench. 
(Off the record discussion between Court and 
counsel.) 
THE COURT: Objection is overruled. 
Q (By Mr. Griffin) Mr. Cook, do you remember the 
facts and the hypothetical situation? 
A Would you ask it again? 
Q Let's suppose you were examining the limited 
partnership in which there is an investment manager that 
will make certain recommendations as to how money is 
going to be used from the limited partnership, 
specifically regarding certain loan criteria. And let's 
assume also that the investment manager never functioned, 
never made those recommendations and, in fact, ever met. 
Would you want those facts disclosed in a disclosure 
document to investors? 
A Yes, that would also be material. It goes to 
the essence of the operation and if there is a change in 
what is disclosed to investors, that should be — that 
information should be in the prospectus to begin with and 
an investor should be informed of that. 
Q And if there is a change that the seller 
realizes later on after he has used the document 
disclosing the investment manager will function, what is 
91 
the proper way of dealing with that? 
MR. KELLER: Objection, 702. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
THE WITNESS: Investors should be informed of 
that change and given a chance to get out of the 
investment. 
Q (By Mr. Griffin) Now, will you pick up again 
State's Exhibit 41-S and can you turn to page 44. I want 
to make sure you are at the right location, Mr. Cook. 
You see the paragraph on the page that begins 
"Furthermore"? 
A Yes. 
Q Would you read that sentence to the jury? 
A "Furthermore, trust deeds and other instruments 
of the Existing Projects, Three of which have a negative 
equity or a loss, will be put into the Collateral Pool 
with similar instruments from any new Projects to which 
Note proceeds are loaned." 
Q Now, this sentence discloses that there are 
three projects, three existing projects that have a 
negative equity or loss; is that correct? 
A Yes. 
MR. KELLER: Objection, Your Honor, that is 
leading. That is counsel's interpretation. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
92 
